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4 Copyright and Libraries: 
Georgia State Copyright Lawsuit 
Case Law 
Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1237, 
1255–58 (11th Cir. 2014) 
Three publishing houses, Cambridge University Press, Oxford University Press, and Sage 
Publications, Inc. (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) allege that members of the Board of Regents of the 
University System of Georgia and officials at Georgia State University (“GSU”) (collectively, 
“Defendants”) infringed Plaintiffs’ copyrights by maintaining a policy which allows GSU 
professors to make digital copies of excerpts of Plaintiffs’ books available to students without 
paying Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs alleged seventy-four individual instances of infringement, which took 
place during three academic terms in 2009. The District Court issued an order finding that 
Plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case of infringement in twenty-six instances, that the 
fair use defense applied in forty-three instances, and that Defendants had infringed Plaintiffs’ 
copyrights in the remaining five instances. 
Finding that GSU’s policy caused the five instances of infringement, the District Court granted 
declaratory and injunctive relief to Plaintiffs. Nevertheless, the District Court found that 
Defendants were the prevailing party and awarded them costs and attorneys’ fees. Because we 
find that the District Court’s fair use analysis was in part erroneous, we reverse the District 
Court’s judgment; vacate the injunction, declaratory relief, and award of costs and fees; and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
[…] 
The Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that Congress shall have the power “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science … by securing for limited Times to Authors … the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings….” U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. As the Supreme Court has 
explained, “the economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant 
copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best 
way to advance public welfare [by promoting the creation and dissemination of ideas] through 
the talents of authors.” Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219, 74 S.Ct. 460, 471, 98 L.Ed. 630 
(1954). 
Promoting the creation and dissemination of ideas has been the goal driving Anglo–American 
copyright law since the enactment of the first English copyright statute to explicitly vest 
copyright in a work’s creator, the Statute of Anne of 1710, which declared that it was “[a]n Act 
for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors … 
during the Times therein mentioned.” 8 Ann., c. 19 (1710); see also Pierre N. Leval, Toward a 
Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L.Rev. 1105 (1990) (describing the Statute of Anne and its 
influence on early U.S. copyright law and the fair use doctrine). Thus, in our tradition, 
“copyright is not an inevitable, divine, or natural right that confers on authors the absolute 
ownership of their creations. It is designed rather to stimulate activity and progress in the arts for 
the intellectual enrichment of the public.” Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 705 (2d Cir.2013) 
(quoting Leval, supra, at 1107); see also Aiken, 422 U.S. at 156, 95 S.Ct. at 2044 (“The 
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor. 
But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public 
good.”). 
The Copyright Act furthers this purpose by granting authors a bundle of “exclusive rights,” 17 
U.S.C. § 106, “in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,” id. § 
102, for a limited time, id. §§ 302–305. While an author holds a copyright in his or her work, the 
author may control, for example, reproduction of the work or distribution of the work to the 
public. Id. § 106(1), (3). 
In part because copyright is not grounded in authors’ natural rights but rather meant to provide 
maximal public benefit, the Copyright Act’s grant to authors of a monopoly over the use of their 
works is limited in several important ways beyond its finite duration. Golan v. Holder, ––– U.S. 
––––, 132 S.Ct. 873, 890–91, 181 L.Ed.2d 835 (2012). For example, “[c]opyright cannot protect 
an idea, only the expression of that idea.” Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 
1257, 1263 (11th Cir.2001); see 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (“In no case does copyright protection for an 
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, 
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, 
illustrated, or embodied in such work.”). Thus, “copyright assures authors the right to their 
original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information 
conveyed by a work.” Feist, 499 U.S. at 349–50, 111 S.Ct. at 1290. 
The fair use doctrine also critically limits the scope of the monopoly granted to authors under the 
Copyright Act in order to promote the public benefit copyright is intended to achieve. See 
Campbell v. Acuff–Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575, 114 S.Ct. 1164, 1169, 127 L.Ed.2d 500 
(1994) (“From the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted 
materials has been thought necessary to fulfill copyright’s very purpose, ‘[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science….’” (quoting U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.)). In other words, fair use 
provides necessary “breathing space within the confines of copyright.” Id. at 579, 114 S.Ct. at 
1171. By allowing for the limited use of copyrighted works without the permission of the 
copyright holder by members of the public in certain circumstances, fair use “permits [and 
requires] courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would 
stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.” Id. at 577, 114 S.Ct. at 1170 
(alteration in original) (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236, 110 S.Ct. 1750, 1767, 109 
L.Ed.2d 184 (1990)). 
In a sense, the grant to an author of copyright in a work is predicated upon a reciprocal grant to 
the public by the work’s author of an implied license for fair use of the work. See Harper & 
Row, 471 U.S. at 549, 105 S.Ct. at 2225 (“[T]he author’s consent to a reasonable use of his 
copyrighted works ha[d] always been implied by the courts as a necessary incident of the 
constitutional policy of promoting the progress of science … since a prohibition of such use 
would inhibit subsequent writers from attempting to improve upon prior works and thus … 
frustrate the very ends sought to be attained.” (quoting H. Ball, Law of Copyright and Literary 
Property 260 (1944))). Thus, in order to promote the creation of new works, our laws 
contemplate that some secondary users—those implied licensees making fair use of copyrighted 
works—will be allowed to make use of original authors’ works. At the same time, a secondary 
user who takes overmuch in the name of fair use operates outside the bounds of his or her 
implied-by-law license. 
How much unpaid use should be allowed is the bailiwick of the fair use doctrine. To further the 
purpose of copyright, we must provide for some fair use taking of copyrighted material. This 
may be viewed as a transaction cost, incidental to the business of authorship. But if we set this 
transaction cost too high by allowing too much taking, we run the risk of eliminating the 
economic incentive for the creation of original works that is at the core of copyright and—by 
driving creators out of the market—killing the proverbial goose that laid the golden egg. 
Thus, the proper scope of the fair use doctrine in a given case boils down to an evidentiary 
question. As a conceptual matter, in making fair use determinations, we must conjure up a 
hypothetical perfect market for the work in question, consisting of the whole universe of those 
who might buy it, in which everyone involved has perfect knowledge of the value of the work to 
its author and to potential buyers, and excluding for the moment any potential fair uses of the 
work. Then, keeping in mind the purposes animating copyright law—the fostering of learning 
and the creation of new works—we must determine how much of that value the implied licensee-
fair users can capture before the value of the remaining market is so diminished that it no longer 
makes economic sense for the author—or a subsequent holder of the copyright—to propagate the 
work in the first place. 
In most instances, licensors (authors and copyright holders) and licensees (both paying licensees, 
and implied-by-law fair use licensees) will independently perform some version of this analysis 
in order to reach a mutually equitable arrangement. Ideally, a copyright holder will sell his or her 
works to buyers who pay the price that the market will bear and will routinely tolerate secondary 
uses which do not adversely impact that market. However, in the event of a disagreement, the 
copyright holder can file an infringement suit and the secondary user may invoke the fair use 
defense. In so doing, the parties essentially turn to a court to make a determination for them as to 
the appropriate boundaries of the secondary user’s implied license. 
Commentary 
Fair Use 17 U.S.C. §107 
Under U.S. Copyright Law, authors and other creators obtain copyright automatically when an 
original work is fixed in a tangible medium of expression, 17 U.S.C. §102. The rights granted 
under copyright are expansive, 17 U.S.C. §106 and long-lasting, 17 U.S.C. §302-305. Currently, 
copyright duration is the life of the author plus 70 years. 17 U.S.C. §302. 
To protect the progress of science and the useful arts, the Copyright Act includes several 
limitations and exceptions to copyright holders’ exclusive rights. 17 U.S.C. §107-122. One 
important exception is Fair Use. 17 U.S.C. §107. 
The Fair Use Statute is short and open to interpretation and has been the subject of extensive 
litigation. (Library of Congress Fair Use Index). (Library of Congress “U.S. Copyright Office 
Fair Use Index” 139) 
17 U.S. Code § 107 – Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, 
including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by 
that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including 
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. 
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to 
be considered shall include— 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or 
is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole; and 
(4 ) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is 
made upon consideration of all the above factors. 
For more on Fair Use, see the Copyright and Libraries: Fair Use Chapter in this textbook at 
https://mlpp.pressbooks.pub/librarylaw/chapter/copyright-fair-use/ 
Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, known as the Georgia State Copyright Case, was a rare fair 
use case that directly addressed the question of fair use in a nonprofit, educational context. 
Specifically, whether digitizing portions of books for use in academic course reserves could be 
considered fair use. Previous fair use case law touched on similar circumstances but differed in 
key points. The “copy shop cases” involved course reading, but in a commercial context. The 
Texaco case involved copying articles for scientists in a commercial setting and introduced 
licensing as a key component of fair use analysis. Several cases were influenced by a failed 
negotiation during the development of the 1976 copyright legislation known as the Classroom 
Copying Guidelines. 
The Classroom Copying Guidelines 
The “Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not–For–Profit Educational 
Institutions with Respect to Books and Periodicals,” is commonly referred to as the “Classroom 
Copying Guidelines.” Because it is not law, it is located in H.R. REP. No. 1476 at 68–71, 94th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5681–5685. 
The Guidelines were the outgrowth of a long period of negotiation between publishers and 
academics who were concerned about the scope of fair use which might be offered in proposed 
fair use legislation, particularly concerning educational uses. The negotiations were supervised 
by the Register of Copyrights and by some members of Congress who exhorted the referenced 
interest groups to produce some understandings about fair use which, potentially, Congress could 
adopt. Litman Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 Cornell 
L.Rev. 857, 862, 865–67 (1987). The hoped-for understanding did not materialize. Cambridge 
Univ. Press v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1228 (N.D. Ga. 2012). 
The guidelines set out a minimum, “safe harbor” for classroom copying within the bounds of fair 
use. This could include a single book chapter, one article from a periodical issue, a poem if less 
than 250 words, a prose excerpt of 2500 words or less, or a single illustration from a book, for 
example. Brevity, spontaneity, and cumulative effect are all required considerations. While the 
Classroom Guidelines do provide some certainty about what would be allowed under fair use, 
they do not balance the four fair use factors in the statute, and instead, replace them with three 
different mandates. (Crews “The Law of Fair Use” 618). 
Publishers and courts have regularly treated the classroom guidelines with more deference than 
might be implied by a document that resulted from a failed negotiation read into legislative 
history. They are repeated in full in the Copyright Office’s Circular 21: Reproduction of 
Copyrighted Works by Educators and Librarians (Library of Congress 6). Courts considering 
educational fair use cases reference the guidelines (Keller and Vats 182). Publisher-plaintiffs ask 
courts to treat the guidelines as a maximum, not minimum standards, and courts have often 
considered the guidelines when considering cases involving copying of educational materials, in 
both commercial and non-commercial contexts. (Crews “The Law of Fair Use” 664-
674); Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1227-1229 (N.D. Ga. 2012). 
The Copy Shop Cases 
In Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., several publishers sued Kinko’s, a commercial 
copy shop, for copyright infringement. Kinko’s created and sold course packs for profit. Kinko’s 
created the coursepacks by copying excerpts from books whose copyrights were held by the 
publishers. They did not obtain permission or pay permission fees to the publishers. Kinko’s 
claimed their use of the excerpts was fair use, specifically provided for in § 107 of the Copyright 
Act. Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). See 
also Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996). 
The Kinko’s court evaluated the case under both the fair use statute and the “Agreement on 
Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not–For–Profit Educational Institutions” (“Classroom 
Guidelines”). 
The court found that Kinko’s was infringing copyrights when it photocopied book chapters for 
sale to students as “coursepacks” for their university classes. Since Kinko’s did the copying, it 
was for commercial, not educational purposes. The court characterized the use as non-
transformational, mere repackaging. The works in question were mostly factual in nature, 
weighing in favor of fair use. The court analyzed the percentage of each work, finding that 5% to 
28% of the original full book was excessive. And the court found that Kinko’s copying 
unfavorably impacted the Plaintiffs’ sales of their books and collection of permissions fees. 
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc. (2nd Cir. 
1994) 
Several publishers sued Texaco for copyright infringement for its practice of making copies of 
articles published in scientific and technical journals for use by the company’s scientists. To 
support its research activities, Texaco subscribed to numerous scientific and technical journals, 
and maintained large libraries. Texaco scientists regularly made or requested copies to be read, 
kept in their personal files, and used in the laboratory in the course of their research work. Am. 
Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
The court found in favor of the publishers. Like in the copy shop cases, the court found the use to 
be commercial under the first factor, despite the purpose being research. Texaco’s commercial 
nature persuaded the court the ultimate purpose was commercial, and the use was 
nontransformative and not fair. The nature of the works was factual, and the use was fair under 
the second factor. The use of the full article was not fair under the third factor. 
The fourth factor analysis solidified the importance of licensing in the market analysis. Texaco 
argued that it would not meet the scientists’ needs by purchasing back issues or back volumes or 
by enormously enlarging its subscriptions. However, article licensing was not an established 
business model at the time but was in development, and the Copyright Clearance Center had 
begun licensing articles. 
“Despite Texaco’s claims to the contrary, it is not unsound to conclude that the right to seek 
payment for a particular use tends to become legally cognizable under the fourth fair use factor 
when the means for paying for such a use is made easier. This notion is not inherently troubling: 
it is sensible that a particular unauthorized use should be considered “more fair” when there is no 
ready market or means to pay for the use, while such an unauthorized use should be considered 
“less fair” when there is a ready market or means to pay for the use. The vice of circular 
reasoning arises only if the availability of payment is conclusive against fair use.” 
Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930–31 (2d Cir. 1994). 
On balance, with only the second factor weighing in favor of fair use, the court found Texaco’s 
practice of providing journal copies to its scientists without paying license fees to be infringing 
the publishers’ copyrights. 
The Georgia State Case 
In 2008 Cambridge University Press, Oxford University Press, and Sage Publications, Inc. sued 
Georgia State University (GSU) for copyright infringement for making works available on its 
electronic reserve system without paying permissions or licensing fees. The American 
Association of Publishers and the Copyright Clearance Center funded the plaintiffs’ lawsuit. 
Among other defenses, GSU, a unit of the University System of Georgia (USG), claimed fair 
use. (Crews Copyright Law for Librarians and Educators: Creative Strategies and Practical 
Solutions 139) 
The case was filed in the United States District Court, Northern District of Georgia, and the first 
opinion was issued in 2012. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (N.D. Ga. 
2012) (cited below as Cambridge I). The plaintiffs appealed the District Court opinion to the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed and remanded the case back to the District 
Court. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, (11th Cir. 2014) (Cambridge II). The 
case was re-decided in Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 371 F.Supp.3d 1218, (N.D. Ga. 2016) 
(Cambridge III). It was appealed again and reversed and remanded in Cambridge Univ. Press v. 
Albert, 906 F.3d 1290, (11th Cir. 2018) (Cambridge IV). The final opinion came in Cambridge 
Univ. Press v. Becker, 446 F.Supp.3d 1145, (N.D. Ga. 2020) (Cambridge V). 
In 2009, the USG developed and implemented a Copyright Policy (University System of 
Georgia) for the University System of Georgia schools, including Georgia State. Under that 
policy, professors completed a fair use checklist, included as part of the 2009 Copyright Policy. 
The court limited the proceedings to works published by the Plaintiffs and used during the 
Spring, Summer, and Fall semesters of 2009. 
To succeed, the court said that the Plaintiffs needed to “show that the new policy resulted in 
ongoing and continuing misuse of the fair use defense. To do so, Plaintiffs must put forth 
evidence of a sufficient number of instances of infringement of Plaintiffs’ copyrights to show 
such ongoing and continuous misuse. Defendants will have the burden of showing that each 
specified instance of 2009 Copyright Policy infringement was a fair use.” Cambridge I, 1203. 
In the opinion, the judge examined “how Georgia State’s 2009 Copyright Policy operated in 
relation to the requirements of copyright law during the three 2009 academic terms.” Cambridge 
I, 1210. 
First Factor 
Beginning with the first factor, the purpose and character of the use, the court explained that 
“[b]ecause Georgia State is a purely nonprofit, educational institution and the excerpts at issue 
were used for purely nonprofit, educational purposes, this case is distinguishable from Kinko’s, 
Michigan Document Services, and Texaco.” Cambridge I, 1224. The court also rejected the 
Plaintiffs’ argument that the nontransformative nature of the excerpts meant that the first fair use 
factor must weigh against fair use, noting that “[t]he obvious statutory exception to this focus on 
transformative uses is the straight reproduction of multiple copies for classroom distribution.” 
(citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 n. 11). Cambridge I, 1224–25. 
The appellate court agreed that the non-profit, educational purpose weighed in favor of fair use 
under the first factor. Cambridge II, 1267. 
Second Factor 
The second factor in the fair use analysis considers the nature of the copyrighted work. More 
creative works tend to get more protection under this factor than do fact-based works. (Library of 
Congress “More Information on Fair Use”) The court noted that none of the works used were 
fictional, but they were not merely descriptive since they include the authors’ perspectives and 
opinions. Cambridge I, 1225-26. 
The 11th Circuit objected to the District Court’s lack of a case-by-case analysis of each work 
under the second factor analysis. 
“Where the excerpts of Plaintiffs’ works contained evaluative, analytical, or subjectively 
descriptive material that surpasses the bare facts necessary to communicate information, or 
derives from the author’s experiences or opinions, the District Court should have held (and 
subsequently did) that the second factor was neutral, or even weighed against fair use in cases of 
excerpts that were dominated by such material. That being said, the second fair use factor is of 
relatively little importance in this case.” 
Cambridge II, 1270. (author parenthetical). 
Third Factor 
The third factor looks at the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole. The portion used must be reasonable in relation to the work from 
which it was taken and the purpose for which it was used. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586. Generally, 
a decidedly small portion of the work is more likely to be fair, especially when the excerpt is a 
mirror-image copy, and the purpose is nontransformative. Id. 
Under the third factor, no bright-line rules apply. In Cambridge I, the judge used a 10%/1-
chapter rubric. The 11th Circuit reversed this approach, noting that “fair use analysis must be 
performed on a case-by-case/work-by-work basis.” Cambridge II, 1271–72 (citing Campbell, 
510 U.S. at 577 at 1170). 
The 11th Circuit similarly affirmed the District Court’s disapproval of the Classroom Guidelines. 
“Plaintiffs assert that the Court should enforce, through an injunctive order, the safe harbor 
limitations of the Guidelines as maximum permissible use” Cambridge I, 1228. “To treat the 
Classroom Guidelines as indicative of what is allowable would be to create the type of “hard 
evidentiary presumption” that the Supreme Court has cautioned against.” Cambridge II, 1273 
(citing Campbell 510 U.S. at 584). 
Fourth Factor 
The fourth factor considers the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work. “It requires courts to consider not only the extent of market harm caused by 
the particular actions of the alleged infringer, but also “whether unrestricted and widespread 
conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant … would result in a substantially adverse impact 
on the potential market for the original.” Campbell, at 1177. 
In GSU, the court emphasized that there are two markets to consider. The first is the market for 
the original work. When considering the entire work, if a small amount is used, it is unlikely to 
significantly damage the market for the entire book. The second market to consider is the market 
for the license for the excerpt. If a license is available for the excerpt, there is market damage if it 
is not purchased. Cambridge I, 1237. 
The amount used in the alleged infringements in the GSU case averaged around 10%, 
“[t]herefore] this case [now] concerns not the market for Plaintiffs’ original works themselves or 
for derivative works based upon those works, but rather a market for licenses to use Plaintiffs’ 
works in a particular way.” Cambridge III, 1233. 
The Texaco decision weighed heavily on the court. “The fact that Plaintiffs have made paying 
easier does not automatically dictate a right to payment.” Cambridge II, 1276. (11th Cir. 2014). 
Nevertheless, “it is sensible that a particular unauthorized use should be considered ‘more fair’ 
when there is no ready market or means to pay for the use, while such an unauthorized use 
should be considered ‘less fair’ when there is a ready market or means to pay for the use. The 
vice of circular reasoning arises only if the availability of payment is conclusive against fair 
use.” Id. at 1277 (quoting Texaco, 60 F.3d at 931). 
However, since the “goal of copyright is to stimulate the creation of new works, not to furnish 
copyright holders with control over all markets. Accordingly, the ability to license does not 
demand a finding against fair use.” Cambridge II, 1276. (11th Cir. 2014). How does this goal of 
copyright help in balancing the factors? 
Balancing the Factors 
In the initial District Court opinion, the court weighted all four factors evenly. The appellate 
court made it clear that method is incorrect. “[T}he Supreme Court has explained that “the four 
statutory factors [may not] be treated in isolation, one from another. All are to be explored, and 
the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.” (internal citation removed). 
In keeping with this approach, a given factor may be more or less important in determining 
whether a particular use should be considered fair under the specific circumstances of the 
case.” Cambridge II, 1260. 
So how should the factors be balanced? In Cambridge V, the court summarized (1160-1162). 
Factor one favors fair use for a nonprofit educational purpose by a nonprofit educational 
institution, even if the use is nontransformative. 
Under the second factor, when works have evaluative material or derive from the author’s own 
experiences or opinions, the factor is neutral or even weighs against fair use. However, it has 
relatively little weight. 
Factor three is intertwined with factor one and also with factor four in that it “partly functions as 
a heuristic to determine the impact on the market for the original.” Cambridge II at 1271. The 
amount used must be considered in light of the pedagogical purpose and the impact on the 
market. Unless the heart of the work is used, a small amount does not impact the market for the 
book, only the market for the excerpt. 
Factor four counts more than any of the other factors where the use is nontransformative and the 
works are used for one of the purposes for which they are marketed. The adverse impact is 
primarily that of market substitution. Id. at 1275. “The importance of the fourth factor will vary, 
not only with the amount of harm, but also with the relative strength of the showing on the other 
factors.” Id. at 1275. 
The fourth factor analysis challenge in the GSU case was that the fourth factor’s weight 
depended on the demand for the license. Where no license was available, anyone could 
reasonably determine so by searching the publicly available information. However, the court 
noted that “[w]here the evidence shows there is no significant demand for an excerpt, the 
likelihood of repetitive use is diminished.” Id. at 1279. 
The only way to know where there was significant demand for an excerpt was to examine the 
records of publishers and the Copyright Clearance Center for data on license sales. That is not 
publicly accessible information, so an instructor wanting to make a fair use analysis cannot fully 
determine the market impact of not purchasing a license. 
Outcome 
The District Court ruled three times over twelve years. Each time, the Court found Georgia State 
the prevailing party. But, since the alleged copyright infringements were considered on a case-
by-case basis, a number of infringing uses were established in each ruling, and the Court issued 
an accompanying injunction against Georgia State. [Since GSU is a state entity, it was not sued 
for monetary damages, and an injunction was the equitable relief granted by the court]. In the 
first ruling, the court found five instances of infringement, four in the second, and the final 
opinion, ten. In most cases where there was infringement, there was a strong demand for the 
license. Usually, although not always, this was paired with a factor three finding against fair use. 
“The Court is convinced that in creating and applying its 2009 Copyright Policy, Georgia State 
tried to comply with the copyright laws. After this lawsuit was filed in 2008 Georgia State 
revamped its then existing copyright policy in an attempt to formalize the process of determining 
when fair use applies.” Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 1:08—CV—1425—ODE Doc. 583, 9 
(N.D. Ga. 2020). But the Court recognized that the unsettled state of the law made the policy 
difficult to fashion. 
The injunction following each ruling was the same – to maintain copyright policies that are not 
inconsistent with the United States Court of Appeals’ rulings for the Eleventh Circuit in the case 
and to inform all Georgia State professors and other instructors in writing of these rulings. Id. at 
13. 
There are important outcomes that are generally applicable that result from the lengthy litigation. 
The 1976 Classroom Guidelines are not law, and publishers’ attempts to use them in litigation 
should cease. Additionally, schools that treat them as maximum allowable limits are 
shortchanging opportunities to make fair use of content. The course pack cases do not apply to 
nonprofit educational uses. Using a small excerpt or a single chapter does not compete with the 
market for an entire book. The difficulty of applying the fourth factor analysis using license sales 
in the court’s manner is problematic. Still, if there is no available license, the fourth factor gets 
little weight. (Butler) 
Scenarios 
Scenario 1: 
In March 2020, campuses around the US and the world suddenly shut down as COVID rapidly 
spread. Many students did not have time to retrieve their books. Libraries had to close, and 
students who relied on print or media reserves for their course materials no longer had access. In 
response, a group of copyright librarians released a Public Statement of Library Copyright 
Specialists: Fair Use & Emergency Remote Teaching & Research <https://tinyurl.com/tvnty3a>. 
Do you think this was necessary? Is the fourth factor less important in a public health 
emergency? 
Scenario 2: 
Download the current version of the Fair Use 
Basics <https://universityattorney.gsu.edu/files/2020/11/Fair-Use-Basics-2020-final.pdf> 
and Fair Use Checklist <https://universityattorney.gsu.edu/files/2020/11/Fair-Use-Checklist-
2020-final.pdf> provided to GSU faculty as part of the University System of Georgia Copyright 
Policy. Librarians are often asked to provide faculty and students instruction on how to stay 
within the bounds of fair use when teaching. Using these documents, how would you develop a 
basic workshop on using copyrighted materials in instruction? 
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